In this paper, we study the problem of analyzing information flow properties of hybrid systems. We begin by formalizing non-interference -the baseline information flow propertyfor hybrid systems. We then present a type system for statically enforcing non-interference, together with a proof of soundness. We conclude with discussions on future work towards analyzing more permissive information flow properties.
INTRODUCTION
With incidents such as Stuxnet attacking SCADA systems (see, e.g., [2] ), the security of embedded control systems has come to the limelight. One of the most fundamental security properties is confidentiality, i.e., the requirement that secret information can only be learned by authorized parties. Security mechanisms such as access control, firewalls, and encryption [5] can ensure confidentiality while secrets are stored in databases or transferred over networks-but they cannot provide security guarantees while actual computation is being performed on the secrets. Information flow control [10, 8] protects secret information during computation, with the goal of achieving end-to-end confidentiality guarantees. The baseline information flow property is noninterference [4] , which forbids any flow of information from classified (or high) to public (or low) domains.
A wide range of techniques have been proposed for reasoning about information flow properties in the context of discrete programs (see the survey [8] ). Most of these techniques rely on static program analysis, which has the adPermission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. vantage of little or no run-time overhead when compared to techniques based on dynamic execution monitoring. Among the static analysis techniques for enforcing secure information flow, type systems for non-interference are probably the most popular approach. For example, in the type system by Volpano et al. [12] , each program variable is annotated with a security type that specifies the domain of the data it stores, and each command is annotated with a security type that specifies the domain of the data it may affect. When typechecking a program, these annotations are combined using typing rules based on program syntax. A successful type check implies that the program will satisfy non-interference at run-time.
Unfortunately, the problem of enforcing information flow has received little attention in the context of embedded control systems, namely, systems in which embedded processors are employed for control. These include safety critical systems such as aerospace, automotive and medical devices among others. An inherent characteristic is the interaction of the embedded processors with a continuous environment. Due to the mixed discrete-continuous behavior exhibited by them, they are popularly referred to as hybrid systems.
In this paper, we investigate the use of type systems for enforcing non-interference for hybrid systems. To this end, we first present a syntax for hybrid systems that resembles that of discrete programs, along with a deterministic semantics. We formalize non-interference based on this model. Intuitively, non-interference for hybrid systems requires that for every two input signals that agree on the values of the variables of low security levels, the output signals also agree on the values of the variables of low security levels. Hence, the observable or low part of the output is invariant with respect to the high input.
We then present a static analysis method for inferring non-interference in hybrid systems. The analysis is based on the type system developed in [12] but includes additional typing judgments for the continuous specification of the system. The typing rule for the continuous dynamics needs to capture the interdependent nature of the evolution of the continuous variables. We prove the soundness of the type system, in the sense that a successful type check implies that the hybrid system satisfies non-interference. We conclude with directions for future work.
PRELIMINARIES
Let N, R and R ≥0 denote the set of natural, real and nonnegative real numbers, respectively. Given a function f , we use dom(f ) to denote the domain of f .
A sequence is a function σ : A → B, where A is {0, · · · , n} for some n ∈ N. Length of a sequence σ : {0, · · · , n} → B is the number of elements in its domain, namely, n + 1. Given two sequences σ1 and σ2, σ1σ2 denotes the concatenations of σ2 after σ1. More precisely, if σ1 : {0, · · · , n1} → A and σ2 : {0, · · · , n2} → A, σ1σ2 : {0, · · · , n1 + n2 + 1} → A such that σ1σ2(i) = σ1(i) for 0 ≤ i ≤ n1 and σ1σ2(i) = σ2(i − n1 − 1) for n1 < i ≤ n1 + n2 + 1. We denote by σ[i, j], the subsequence of σ from the i-th element to the j-th element, that is,
Given an elementx ∈ R n , we usex|i to denote the projection ofx to the i-th component, namely,xi, wherex = (x1, · · · ,xn). Given a function f : A → R n , the function f |i represent the projection of the image to the i-th component, that is, f |i : A → R such that for every a ∈ A, f |i(a) = f (a)|i.
DETERMINISTIC HYBRID SYSTEMS
Hybrid systems are systems exhibiting both discrete and continuous behaviors. The continuous behavior is typically modeled by a system of ordinary differential equations, and the discrete behavior corresponding to the control logic is modelled by a finite state automaton (see, for example, [6] ). In general, the behavior of a hybrid system can be nondeterministic. In this paper, we focus on hybrid systems with deterministic behaviors, that is, systems which exhibit a unique behavior given an input signal and an initial state. To this end, we present a model which is analogous to a program.
Syntax
First, we present a simple syntax for expressing deterministic hybrid systems as a programming language.
Let us fix a set of input variables Var U = {u1, · · · , u k } and a set of state variables Var X = {x1, · · · , xn}. A hybrid system H over (Var U , Var X ) is defined inductively as follows:
where e is an expression over Var U ∪ Var X formed from constants and variables using the arithmetic operators of addition and multiplication, and b is a boolean combination of predicates of the form e > 0. We will also treat b as an expression returning the boolean values 0 or 1 and as being formed using the binary operators >, ¬ (essentially ¬b is interpreted as 1 − b) and ∧. We assume that the variables occurring in b are state variables.
The expression e represents a polynomial expression over the variables in Var, and the predicate b is a polynomial constraint over the state variables. The continuous dynamics of the system is specified using the system of n differential equations and an invariant, ẋ1 = e1, · · · ,ẋn = en, b . The variables evolve according to the differential equations and satisfy the constraint specified by b at all times. The expression [x1 := e1, · · · , xn := en] specifies the discrete jumps, namely, the value of a state variable xi after the jump is obtained by evaluating the expression ei with the values of the variables before the jump. The operator H; H specifies sequential composition, if b then H else H specifies branching and while b do H specifies looping.
Semantics
Next, we specify the semantics of the hybrid system. Before that, we define the notions of trajectories and transitions.
The continuous evolution of the system is given by a trajectory which is a solution of a system of differential equations given a continuously evolving input trajectory.
Definition. A trajectory is a continuous function τ : [0, t] → R n , for some n ∈ N and t ∈ R ≥0 . We denote the set of all trajectories with range
The variables in Var = Var U ∪ Var X take values in R. Hence, we define the input domain U to be R k , and the state domain X to be R
n . An elementū ∈ U is interpreted as a valuation which assignsū|i to the input variable ui, and similarly, an elementx ∈ X is interpreted as a valuation which assignsx|i to the state variable xi. Hence, given an expression e, we denote by [[e] ](ū,x), the result obtained by evaluating the expression after substituting each variable by the corresponding value fromū orx. Similarly, given a predicate b, we say thatx satisfies b, denotedx |= b, if substituting for the variables in b by the corresponding values inx, the predicate evaluates to true; otherwisex |= b.
We capture the state evolution in response to a continuous input by an input-state trajectory.
Definition. An input-state trajectory over (Var
An input-state trajectory (u , x ) is a prefix of an inputstate trajectory (u, x) if u is a prefix of u and x is a prefix of x.
Assumption. We make the standard assumptions that the functions defined by the polynomial expressions in the right hand sides of the differential equations satisfy the conditions for existence and uniqueness of solutions of the differential equations (see, for example, [7] , for details of such conditions).
An input-state trajectories (u, x) is consistent with a system of differential equationsẋ1 = e1, · · · ,ẋn = en, if x is a solution starting from x(0) on u, that is, there exists a T with dom(u) = dom(x) = [0, T ], and for each t ∈ [0, T ] and
The derivative of the projection of x to the i-th component at anytime t is equivalent to the value of the expression ei evaluated at the values of x and u at time t.
The first state of (u, x), namely, x(0), is denoted as first((u, x)), and the last state, namely, x(T ), where
The transitions capture the discrete jumps in the systems due to impulse input.
The only prefix of a transition is the transition itself. As before, we define the first and last state of a transition, namely, first((x1,ū,x2)) =x1 and last((x1,ū,x2)) =x2.
An execution of the hybrid system is a sequence of inputstate trajectories and transitions such that the last state of an element in the sequence matches with the starting state of the next element in the sequence.
Definition. An execution over (Var U , Var X ) is a finite sequence σ of input-state trajectories and transitions over (Var U , Var X ), such that, for every i > 0 in dom(σ), last(σ(i− 1)) = first(σ(i)). Let Exec denote the set of executions over (Var U , Var X ). Note that an input-state trajectory or a transition is an execution with domain {0}. An execution σ of length n is a prefix of an execution σ of length n if n ≤ n and σ(i) = σ (i) for every 0 ≤ i < n and σ (n ) is a prefix of σ(n ).
Again, we use first(σ) and last(σ) for the first and last states of the execution σ, namely, first(σ(0)) and last(σ(l)), where dom(σ) = {0, · · · , l}, respectively. An execution σ can be interpreted as a pair of sequences by separating the input and the state parts. We represent an execution σ also as a pair (σu, σx), where
• dom(σu) = dom(σx) = dom(σ), and
We call σu and σx, the input and state signal corresponding to σ, respectively. The semantics of a hybrid system H over (Var c .
•
consists of executions which are input-state trajectories (u, x) consistent with the system of differential equationsẋ1 = e1, · · · ,ẋn = en such that
where
Remark. Note that the set of complete executions associated with a hybrid system is a subset of the set of all executions associated with it, that is, [ 
Determinism
A set of executions is deterministic if corresponding to every input signal and initial state, there is at most one state signal.
Definition
The next proposition states that the semantics of a hybrid system is deterministic.
Note that given an input trajectory and an initial state, the state trajectory if it exists corresponds to the unique solution guaranteed by the conditions of existence and uniqueness on the system of differential equations. The discrete jumps are correspond to a function from the initial state and input to a final state (as opposed to a relation), and hence is deterministic. The rest are standard constructs of a programming language which do not introduce any non-determinism. Details of the proof can be found in the Appendix. Given an input signal and initial state, there might not always exist a corresponding state signal. For instance, for the flow construct, the solution of the differential equations corresponding to an input signal and an initial state may not satisfy the invariant. The other reason why a state signal might not exists is if the input is not of the expected type, that is, a discrete transition expects an impulse input and a continuous execution an input trajectory. Hence, we define the notion of a valid input for a given state.
Definition. An input signal σu is said to be valid for H and an initial statex0, if there exists an execution (σu, σx) in H with first(σx) =x0. In this case, we will denote the unique state signal corresponding to an input signal σu and an initial statex0 as ΦH(σu,x0).
When H is clear from the context, we drop the subscript H in ΦH.
NON-INTERFERENCE
In this section, we present a notion of non-interference [4] for hybrid systems. There are various formalizations of noninterference on different system models; in the context of program semantics one typically requires that the values of high security variables do not affect those of low security variables [12, 8] .
As is common, we consider a simple scenario with only two security levels H and L, for high and low security data, respectively. Non-interference requires that, for any two input signals that agree on their low security components, the corresponding state signals, if any, also agree on the low components. Hence, the effects of changes in the high security components is not observable.
More The variable τ will be use to range over the security types, namely, H and L, and we assume the ordering L < H. We usex|τ andū|τ to represent the projection of the statex and the inputū to the components corresponding to the variables with security type τ or lower, respectively; and similarly, we use σu|τ and σx|τ to denote the projection of the input signal and the state signal to the variables with security type τ or lower, respectively. We assume that the output variables are the same as the state variables, however, not all the state variables are observable, only the low security state variables are public.
Remark. A well-studied problem in control theory is observability, wherein, the question is to estimate the current state of the system by observing its output. Noninterference, on the other hand, refers to the problem of inferring the high input or the state by observing the low input or the state.
A SOLUTION BASED ON TYPE SYSTEMS
In this section, we present a security type system for statically reasoning about information flow in hybrid systems. The type system is sound, i.e., it guarantees that every welltyped hybrid system satisfies non-interference. Our presentation of the type system closely follows that of [12] , but is extended with typing rules for the continuous specification of the system. The typing rules are given in Figures 1, 2 , and 3 and are explained below.
(Int) λ n : τ n = 0, 1
λ e1 : τ λ e2 : τ λ e1 • e2 : τ
• binary operator A type system is used to derive judgments of the form λ p : ρ. Here, λ is an environment that assigns a security type H or L to each variable, p is either an expression, a variable, or a hybrid system, and ρ is either τ (corresponding to an expression), τ var (corresponding to a variable), or τ cmd (corresponding to a hybrid system). 
(Jump)
λ xi : τi var for 1 ≤ i ≤ n λ ei : τi for 1 ≤i ≤ n τ ≤ τi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n λ [x1 := e1, · · · , xn := en] : τ cmd (Flow) λ xi : τi var for 1 ≤ i ≤ n λ ei : τi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n λ b : τ τ ≤ τi for 1 ≤ i ≤ n λ ẋ1 := e1, · · · ,ẋn := en, b : τ cmd (Comp) λ H1 : τ cmd λ H2 : τ cmd λ H1; H2 : τ cmd (If) λ b : τ λ H1 : τ cmd λ H2 : τ cmd λ if b then H1 else H2 : τ cmd (While) λ b : τ λ H : τ cmd λ while b do H : τ cmdλ p : τ cmd τ ≤ τ λ p : τ cmd (Subtype-2) λ p : τ τ ≤ τ λ p : τ
Figure 3: Subtyping rules
The statements without a horizontal line are axioms. Statements with a horizontal line are inference rules, with the premise above and the conclusion below the line. A typing judgment is inferred from the type system, if it is the last statement in a sequence of statements such that each statement is either an axiom, or is inferred by an inference rule of the type system from previous statements in the sequence. We say that a hybrid system H is well-typed according to a variable typing λ if there exists a τ such that λ H : τ cmd can be inferred.
A judgment with security type τ for an expression e implies that the information contained in e is of type τ or lower. A type τ cmd for a hybrid system H indicates that every variable which H assigns to has type τ or greater.
This information is used to prevent explicit and implicit flows of information. Explicit flows are prevented, e.g., by the typing rules for (Jump) in Figure 2 : the rule requires equality between the security types of the variable on the left and the expression on the right, preventing the explicit flow of high data into a low variable. Note however that the rule (Subtype-2) in Figure 3 allows to change the security type of right-hand expression to a higher level, thereby allowing flow from low to high. Implicit flows are prevented, e.g., by the typing rule (If) in Figure 2 : the rule again requires equality between the security types of the guard and that of the branches, which prevents typing of programs of the kind
in which the control flow (rather than an assignment) leaks information from high to low. The rule (Subtype-1) in Figure 3 allows to use programs with assignments to high variables as branches under a low guard (but not vice versa). Note that we do not need the (Subtype-1) rule in our setting, since all the state variables are present in the (Jump) and (Flow) equations, which in turn sets the type of every command to be the lowest type of the state variables. However, in a more general setting, where the jump and flow equations do not contain all the state variables, one will need subtyping.
The remainder of the typing rules are standard, with the exception of the rule (Flow) in Figure 2 that deals with the continuous behavior of the hybrid system. Again, noninterference is enforced in a system of differential equations by local static syntax checks on each of the differential equations (as if they were assignments).
The following theorem shows that a successful syntactic type check implies the semantic notion of non-interference. Proof. We will prove the following claims:
1. If λ e : τ can be inferred, then for any two states x1,x2 ∈ X and any two inputsū1,ū2 ∈ U such that x1|τ =x2|τ andū1|τ =ū2|τ , then [ Proof by induction on the structure of the inference. More precisely, it suffices to show that each of the inference rules preserves the claims. First we show that the first claim holds for the inference rules corresponding to the expressions.
Case (Int): Here e = n, where n = 0 or 1. Since [[e]](ū,x) = n for everyū andx, the claim is trivially satisfied.
Case (R-Var): Here e = x, where x is a variable. Note that λ x : τ var implies that λ(x) = τ . Again, the claim is trivially satisfied.
Case (Op): Letx1,x2 ∈ X be two states andū1,ū2 ∈ U be two inputs such thatx1|τ =x2|τ andū1|τ =ū2|τ . Then
Case (Subtype-1): Letx1,x2 ∈ X be two states and u1,ū2 ∈ U be two inputs such thatx1| τ =x2| τ andū1| τ =ū 2|τ . Then,x1|τ =x2|τ andū1|τ =ū2|τ , since τ ≤ τ implies that the variables with type τ is a subset of variables of type τ . Therefore, x2,ū2) .
Next, we show that the second claim holds for the inference rules corresponding to the hybrid system. Letx0 and x 0 be states and σu and σ u be a pair of input signals that are valid forx0 andx 0 , respectively, such thatx0|L =x 0 |L and σu|L = σ u |L.
Case ( and σ u |L, also satisfy system S. Sincex0|L =x 0 |L and σu|L = σ u |L, and the solutions of the differential equations are unique (due to standard conditions of existence and uniqueness of differential equations), we obtain that Φ(σu,x0)|L =Φ(σ u ,x 0 )|L.
Suppose σu is valid forx0. ThenΦ(σu,x0) satisfies the invariant b. Since b has type τ ≤ τi for every i, b is of type low. SinceΦ(σu,x0)|L =Φ(σ u ,x 0 )|L and b is of type low, Φ(σ u ,x 0 ) also satisfies b and hence is valid. Therefore σ u is valid forx 0 . The other direction is similar.
If σu is valid forx0 and σ u is valid forx 0 , thenΦ(σu,x0)|L = Φ(σ u ,x 0 )|L implies that Φ(σu,x0)|L = Φ(σ u ,x 0 )|L.s Case (Comp): Suppose σu is valid forx0 in H. There exists an execution σ = (σu, σx) ∈ Exec(H). Then there exist executions σ f and σ s such that σ = σ f σ s , where σ f is a complete execution or σ s is empty. We can apply the induction hypothesis on H1 to infer that the prefix σ u corresponding to σ are both complete or are both not complete. Also, the lower part of last states of the executions coincide. Hence, we can apply the induction hypothesis again on the remaining input signal σ s to obtain an execution for H2. Concatenating the two gives an execution for H which is valid for σ u andx 0 . Further, the executions corresponding to both σu and σ u are either both complete or incomplete follows directly from the induction hypotheses corresponding to Claim 2(c) for H1 and H2. Finally, Φ(σu,x0)|L = ΦH 2 (σ
If σu is valid forx0, then either b |=x0 and σu is valid for H1 or b |=x0 and σu is valid for H2. First, we note that if there is at least one low variable in the system, then τ cmd is always L (one can prove this by induction). Assumping Var X L = ∅ (otherwise there is nothing to prove), we infer that τ = L. Sincex0|L =x 0 |L, and the type of b is L, b |=x 0 if and only if b |=x0. We obtain from induction hypothesis of H1 and H2 that either b |=x 0 and σ u is valid for H1 or b |=x 0 and σ u is valid for H2. There fore σ u is valid for H withx 0 as the initial state. Also, note that state signals agree on the low variable values and on the completeness of the execution.
Case (While): The argument is similar to the case for (Comp). Here an execution is split into a finite number of sub-executions into two. If an input signal σu is valid forx0, then it can be split into sub-signals corresponding to the body of the while loop, namely, H. Then induction hypothesis can be applied to each of these parts to obtain a valid execution for each of the sub-signals of σ u . These can then be concatenated to obtain an execution to the while loop, using the fact that the sub-executions agree on the low variable values and b only depends on the low variable values.
Remark. The above theorem establishes the soundness of the type inference system. In fact, we can also show that every hybrid system, in which the expressions on the right hand sides have variables whose type is not higher than the type of the variable on the left, and the variables in the guards (of the if and while statements) is low, has a type inference using the type system.
Discussions.
Though the rules in the type system appear similar to that in [12] , there are some fundamental differences between their interpretation in a hybrid system versus that in a discrete program. The variable assignments to all the variables happen concurrently in the hybrid system, and so does the evolution of the continuous variables. One can safely interpret a variable update as a sequence of updates to a fresh set of variables followed by a copy-back to the original variables.
However, such a sequential interpretation is not possible for the continuous evolution. In particular, one not only needs to ensure that in each of the individual differential equationsẋi = ei, there is no unauthorized flow from the variables in ei to xi, but also needs to recursively ensure that there is no indirect path from a higher typed variable to xi in the set of differential equations. However, it turns out that this is equivalent to ensuring that each individual differential equation is well-typed. More precisely, the typing rules impose a structure on the system of differential equations which decompose the system into two subsystems: (1) a subsystem whose statespace corresponds to only the low state variables, and inputs given by only low input variables; and (2) a subsystem whose statespace corresponds to the high state variables with inputs consisting of all the input variables and also the low state variables. It is clear that the solutions projected to the low state variables in such a system depend only the low variable values. For example, for a linear systemẋ = Ax + Bu, this implies that A and B have upper block triangular structure (for appropriate ordering of the state and input variables).
Example. Consider the simple hybrid system:
H := if u > 0 then ẋ = 1, x > 3 else ẋ = 2, x < 0 , where u is a high input variable and x is a low state variable. There is no direct flow of information from from u to x, but there is an implicit flow due to the condition u > 0. That is, by observing x, one can deduce whether u > 0 or not. We will not be able to deduce γ H : τ cmd for any τ . Now suppose u is a low input variable and x is a high state variable. The following is a partial derivation of a judgment for H. Here, the derivations corresponding to 1, 2 and 3 are not given.
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIREC-TIONS
We formalized a notion of non-interference for hybrid systems and proposed a type system-based static analysis for verifying non-interference. Non-interference is often considered to be too restrictive for practical scenarios. In the context of discrete programs, this restriction is typically circumvented by declassification [9] (which allows to specify which parts of the secret may be leaked) or by quantification [1] (which allows to specify bounds on the amount of leaked information). As ongoing work, we are investigating formalizations and analysis techniques for such relaxed notions in the context of hybrid systems.
Moreover, we will investigate hybrid systems counterpart to the interpretation of information-flow properties as a safety property over pairs of program runs [11] . Progress along those lines will allows us to use existing safety analysis tools for reasoning about information-flow properties in hybrid systems [3] .
